Africa-European Union trade and development relations : a poisoned chalice? by Le Pere, Garth











Africa’s relationship with Europe has been profoundly shaped and influenced by the legacy 
of colonialism, especially with regard 
to its central tenets of accumulation, 
extraction, and control. This is a fortiori 
the case regarding the extent to which 
this relationship has become embedded 
in the European Union’s (EU’s) neo-
colonial trade and development 
policy architecture. In essence, it has 
enmeshed the former colonies of 
Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
in deeply entrenched modalities of 
structural inequality and inequity. 
These modalities find expression 
in a carefully choreographed 
political economy of domination 
and dependency. They are rooted in 
the founding treaty of the European 
Community and its original six 
members. Thus the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome provided the foundational 
elements for the form and texture of 
future relations by defining a framework 
for European cooperation with 22 
colonial dependencies and off-shore 
territories. This entailed offering them 
special trade and economic support 
measures which were followed in 1958 
with the setting up of the European 
Development Fund (EDF) as a special 
envelope to finance economic and 
social development projects.
Following the period of 
independence in the 1960s and 
presented with something of a Hobson’s 
choice, African countries opted to 
maintain these pre-independence 
schemes under the rubric of the 
EU-Africa Partnership. This took 
contractual form with the signing of the 
first Yaoundé Convention in July 1963 
between the European Community 
(EC) and 18 African countries. The 
Convention institutionalised and 
formalised the de facto colonial regime 
of trade, development and financial 
aid on the basis of reciprocal and non-
discriminatory arrangements.1 
The second incarnation of Yaoundé 
signed in July 1969 made the EDF 
the primary vehicle for funding 
development projects while prolonging 
the asymmetric non-discriminatory 
arrangements. When the Yaoundé 
Convention was superseded by the 
first Lomé Convention in February 
1975 and the EC’s enlargement was 
strengthened by the accession of 
the United Kingdom, the stage was 
set for a more extensive articulation 
of the dependency and domination 
syndrome, the promotion of the fiction 
of partnership, and the marginalisation 
of ACP countries in global trade. 
A unique feature of the Lomé 
Convention was the abandonment of 
the reciprocity and non-discriminatory 
principle in favour of unilateral and 
discriminatory trade preferences 
to which only countries in the ACP 
family would have ‘privileged’ access. 
These were complemented by special 
commodity protocols, price-loss 
compensation mechanisms for 
agriculture and mining as well as aid 
and political dialogue provisions. This 
basic package was not significantly 
altered during the four renewal periods 
of the convention whose currency 
expired in 2000. 
However, the most insidious 
development was what John Ravenhill 
has termed “collective clientelism”2 
which came to underpin the new Lomé 
framework. Coterminous with the first 
instalment of the convention was the 
signing of the Georgetown Agreement 
in 1975 which established the ACP as 
a political grouping, then represented 
by 46 countries, the majority of which 
were from Africa. (This number would 
eventually increase to 79, including 48 
from Africa (South Africa joined in 1998 
although its relationship is governed by a 
separate bilateral Trade, Development, 
and Cooperation Agreement). The 
rest was made up of 16 from the 
Caribbean, and 15 from the Pacific.) 
Hence, despite sanctimonious and 
rhetorical EC/EU claims of partnership 
based on a “special relationship” and 
a larger commitment to enhanced 
trade and aid, the Lomé Convention 
provided the clientilist impetus 
for the increasing impoverishment 
and underdevelopment of the ACP 
grouping. 
It is now incumbent on African countries to 
become subjects of history by turning this 
relationship from an instrumental project into 
a moral enterprise. 
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In Africa especially, the encomium 
of Lomé representing “the most 
comprehensive North South 
partnership” confounded some cold 
realities: 
• the continent continued to lag 
behind other developing countries 
especially in world trade indicators; 
levels of poverty and social 
deprivation rose sharply; 
• the unilateral preferences granted 
hardly registered any positive growth 
impact let alone being a vector for 
increasing value-added exports; 
• related to this, the composition of 
Africa’s trade basket showed little 
evidence of diversification during 
the life of the convention and its 
four iterations from 1975-2000; 
• the special compensation 
mechanisms for loss in revenue 
due to world price fluctuations in 
agriculture and mining outputs did 
not live up to the promise of halting 
the precipitous deterioration in 
Africa’s terms of trade; 
• as an ultimate indictment, under 
Lomé more African countries came 
to be officially designated as “least 
developed”; and
• Lomé IV (1990-2000) introduced 
a political dimension that stressed 
human rights, democracy, 
and gender issues as punitive 
conditionalities to be used against 
countries that insufficiently adhered 
to them, thus enabling the EC 
to arbitrarily restrict trade and 
development benefits. 
The multiple failures of Lomé 
to prove its efficacy as a normative 
framework led to a re-evaluation 
of the EU’s trade and development 
regime. This particularly concerned the 
compatibility of its trade arrangements 
with WTO rules which meant a return 
to reciprocity after 25 years where the 
“enabling clause” that allowed non-
reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
treatment hardly turned out to be 
an unmitigated blessing for the ACP 
group. Moreover, full reciprocity in 
trade arrangements would ensure the 
EU a level of market access that was 
increasingly attractive to third parties 
such as the USA, China, Brazil, and 
India especially when it came to Africa. 
Other concerns which informed the 
change in the EU’s attitude toward 
the ACP included a post-Cold War 
geo-strategic shift in political priorities 
and resource allocation to Eastern 
Europe and countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean. The Lomé experience 
also accounted for a large measure 
of donor fatigue which had led to a 
reduced political appetite among EU 
members to fund development projects 
and programmes that were not subject 
to strict oversight and accountability.
It was, therefore, the logic of a 
different kind of relationship that 
informed the Lomé successor, namely 
the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 
which would span two decades. A very 
critical component of Cotonou was 
its WTO-compatible and reciprocal 
Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) which were to be negotiated 
with ACP countries from the beginning 
of 2008 onwards.3 However, 
notwithstanding the level of ambition 
enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement, 
there was nothing to suggest a decisive 
break from those debilitating and 
disempowering structural features 
that had characterised the history of 
Africa-EU relations. Nevertheless, the 
Cotonou Agreement represented a 
much more elaborate carrot-and-stick 
approach and rested on five pillars:
• there was a much more 
comprehensive political dimension 
that included enhanced dialogue 
with a special emphasis on 
preventing and resolving conflict 
but also for promoting democracy 
and good governance, respect for 
human rights, and the rule of law;
• an innovative part of the agreement 
provided for participation by social 
and economic actors, including civil 
society and the private sector;
• there was a strong focus on poverty 
reduction;
• the new framework for trade and 
economic cooperation placed strong 
emphasis on regional integration as 
a key element of the EPAs;4 and
• the agreement simplified financial 
instruments and made them more 
flexible in order to encourage fiscal 
cooperation, but also introduced 
performance criteria as far as the 
allocation of aid was concerned.
However, what has proven most 
contentious and controversial, 
especially for African countries, has 
been the impact which the EPAs will 
have on their growth and development 
prospects. A primary concern has been 
the balkanising effects of EPAs which 
divides the continent into regional 
blocs for the purpose of negotiations. 
Based on their regional affiliation, 
individual countries are than invited 
to agree and sign onto “interim EPAs” 
as a first step towards locking all 
countries into particular configurations 
for purposes of concluding a final 
reciprocal arrangement, albeit with 
an asymmetrical fig leaf in timing and 
content. 
This attempt to rationalise African 
regionalism could prove antithetical to 
the African Union’s broader regional 
and continental integration agenda 
at a time when important initiatives 
have been put in place. The most 
notable is the proposed tripartite 
free trade agreement between the 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), and the East Africa 
Community (EAC). The divisive effects 
of EPAs are hardly complementary 
to these regional bodies’ wider and 
deeper ambition of enhanced market 
integration and improved intra-regional 
trade, infrastructure development, 
and their industrialisation and trade 
facilitation agenda. This is so since 
most crucially the tripartite geographic 
area knits the markets of 26 African 
countries together with a population of 
close to 600 million and a combined 
GDP of US$1 trillion. This tripartite 
arrangement is meant to provide the 
gravitation pull for a continent-wide 
free trade agreement by 2017 in 
an environment where EPAs would 
constitute a powerful anti-integrationist 
tendency and adversarial force. 
It can thus be argued that EPAs have 
consequences and implications that 
could become the albatross around 
the neck of continental integration 
imperatives and there are several 
considerations which are germane in 
this regard. 
Firstly, there is the potential loss 
of tariff revenue that could reduce 
the ability of African countries to 
provide much needed social and 
welfare services. It has been estimated 
generally that three-quarters of ACP 
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countries could lose over 40% of their 
tariff revenue due to duty and quota 
free EU imports entering their markets; 
in Africa the effects would be even 
more detrimental since tariffs account 
for 7-10% of fiscal revenue.5 
Secondly, EPAs entrench the power 
imbalance between the EU and the ACP 
countries with even greater intensity. 
They overwhelmingly represent 
unabashed EU self-interest with an 
excessive neo-mercantilist orientation 
that leans toward dominating market 
access, on the one hand; and reprobate 
protectionism on the other, especially 
where African countries might have 
some comparative advantage such as in 
agricultural production and processing. 
Moreover, the EU Commission 
represents a bureaucratic juggernaut 
with a technical and strategic negotiating 
capacity that heavily burdened African 
negotiators and regional secretariats can 
hardly match. 
And thirdly, EPAs as currently being 
implemented are not strategically and 
operationally aligned with regional 
and continental programmes to deliver 
long-term development, economic 
growth, and poverty reduction because 
of the EU’s aggressive pursuit of its 
offensive interests. Moreover, the EPA’s 
market liberalisation emphasis does 
not take account of Africa’s lack of 
economic and trading capacity as well as 
its multiple supply-side challenges and 
deficits in infrastructure, development 
finance, and human capital. Thus 
EPAs directly undermine the extent to 
which African countries and regions 
have the necessary flexibility over the 
timing, pace, sequencing, and product 
coverage of liberalising their markets to 
the EU. In short, the majority of poor 
country producers would not be able 
to compete with the muscular ability 
which EPAs would afford the EU’s 
growing footprint in African markets.
Interestingly however, Africa’s geo-
political relevance has improved in 
the recent past. This has been driven 
mainly by robust global commodity 
demand, steady economic growth, 
and improved forms of economic and 
political governance. As a consequence, 
the EU has sought improved dialogue 
on the basis of a redefined strategic 
partnership that promotes a normative 
and ethical shift away from doing 
things for Africa to doing things with 
Africa. This shift has been manifested 
in EU-Africa summitry starting in Cairo 
in April 20006 which has put in place 
a range of action plans to provide 
support in critical areas of peace and 
security, governance and human rights, 
regional and continental integration, 
as well as energy and climate change. 
These commitments culminated in a 
renovated and overhauled “EU-Africa 
Strategic Partnership” in 2005 which 
was supplemented by an operational 
Africa-EU Joint Strategy in 2007. Both 
have provided the general template as 
well as the cooperation parameters for 
a new type of partnership between the 
EU and the African Union.7
Of course, the EU’s recourse to 
this new type of partnership which 
is based on equity and a harmony 
of interests take into account the 
growing pluralism in Africa’s external 
political and economic relations and 
the alternative opportunities that 
these bring with them. There is, for 
example, the system of preferences 
afforded to eligible African countries 
for duty free access to the United 
States under the rubric of the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act. But 
even more auspicious is the different 
calculus of choice which the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa) jointly and severally 
provide for African countries in terms 
of more permissive and supportive 
trade, investment, and development 
aid opportunities. These developments 
will hopefully allow African countries 
to incrementally break free of the EU’s 
stifling and obstructive structural yoke 
but also provide them with an optic 
to finally see through its hypocrisy 
and double-talk which masquerade 
as noble and virtuous intentions. In 
this regard, we are reminded of EH 
Carr’s pithy dictum which avers that 
a harmony of interests “thus serves as 
an ingenious moral device invoked, in 
perfect sincerity, by privileged groups 
in order to justify and maintain their 
dominant position.”8 
In the face of new challenges to its 
historical hegemony, it is all the more 
likely that the EU will seek to maintain 
if not strengthen the hard integuments 
which have given it such a dominant 
and commanding position in shaping 
Africa’s colonial and post-colonial 
political economy on the basis of 
its different trade and development 
cooperation frameworks. However, it is 
now incumbent on African countries to 
become subjects of history by turning 
this relationship from an instrumental 
project into a moral enterprise. ■
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1 Reciprocity and non-discrimination are very important 
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and non-discriminatory” treatment for developing 
countries under GATT/WTO rules. It was this 
“enabling clause” that informed the spirit of the Lomé 
Convention.
2 See John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: The Lomé 
Conventions and North-South Relations, New York: 
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still benefit from duty free access to the EU market 
through the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
which was adopted in 2001. In April 2007, the EU 
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to non-LDCs in the ACP group but this probably a 
case of “too little, too late”.  
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attend because of what the EU viewed as gross human 
rights violations, poor governance and abuse of the 
rule of law.   
7 See Garth le Pere, “AU-EU Security and Governance 
Cooperation,” in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye 
Whiteman, (eds.), The EU and Africa: From Euro-
Afrique to Afro-Europa, New York: Columbia 
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Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
New York: Palgrave, 2001 (first published in 1939), 
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